The aryan man is superior culturally, they are the founders of civilization Sieg Heil

[Naofumi]

in Germany, the disastrous World War, which pitted Germany against the
whole of Europe, would never have taken place.
But though Schonerer succeeded in penetrating to the essentfa1s of a
problem, he was frequently mistaken in his judgment of men.
And here, on the other hand, lay Dr. Lueger's strength.
He had a rare gift of insight into human nature, and he was very careful
not to take men as something better than they really were. He based his
plans on the practical possibilities that human life offered him, whereas
Schonerer had only little understanding in that respect. All ideas that this
pan-German had were theoretically right, but he didn't have the
forcefulness or understanding necessary to put his ideas across to the broad
masses. He was unable to formulate them for the masses, whose powers of
comprehension are limited, and will always remain so. Therefore all
Schonerer's knowledge was only visionary wisdom; he never could
succeed in putting it into practice.
This lack of insight into human nature led him to err in estimating the
forces behind certain movements and the inherent strength of old institutions.
Schonerer indeed realized that his questions involved the nature of a
worldview. But he didn't understand that only the broad masses of a nation
can make such convictions-which are almost religious in nature-prevail.
Unfortunately, he only poorly understood how weak the fighting spirit of
the so-called bourgeoisie is. That weakness is due to their business interests;
they are much too afraid of taking risks, and this deters them from acting.
And generally speaking, a worldview has no prospect of success unless
the broad masses declare themselves ready to act as its standard-bearers,
and to fight on its behalf-wherever and to whatever degree necessary.
This failure to understand the importance of the lower strata of society
resulted in a very inadequate conception of the social question.
In all this, Dr. Lueger was the opposite of Schonerer.
His profound knowledge of human nature enabled him to correctly judge
the various social forces, and it saved him from underrating the power of
existing institutions. And it was perhaps this very quality that enabled him
to utilize those institutions as a means to serve the purposes of his policy.
He saw only too clearly that, in our day, the political fighting power of
the upper classes is quite insignificant; it is incapable of fighting for a great
new movement until the triumph of that movement is secured. Thus he
devoted the larger part of his political activity to the task of winning over
those sections of the population whose existence was in danger, and to
fostering a militant spirit in them rather than attempting to paralyze it. He

 

[Naofumi]

was also quick to adopt all available means for winning the support oflong
established institutions, in order to derive the greatest possible advantage
for his movement from those old sources of power.
Thus it was that, first of all, he chose as the social basis of his new
party a middle class that was threatened with extinction. He thus secured a
solid following, one that was willing to make great sacrifices and had good
fighting power. His extremely wise attitude towards the Catholic Church
rapidly won over large numbers of younger clergy-so much so that the
old Clerical Party was forced to abandon the field of action or else, which
was the wiser course, join the new party, in the hope of gradually winning
back one position after another.
But it would be a serious injustice to the man if we regarded this as his
essential characteristic. For he possessed the qualities of an astute tactician,
and had the true genius of a great reformer; but all these were limited by
his exact perception of the possibilities at hand, and also of his own
capabilities.
The goals that this really eminent man decided to pursue were intensely
practical. He wished to conquer Vienna, the heart of the monarchy. It was
from Vienna that the last pulses oflife beat through the diseased, worn-out
body of the crumbling empire. If the heart could be made healthier, the
others parts of the body were bound to revive. That idea was correct in
principle. But the time required to make this happen was strictly limited.
And that was the man's weakness.
His achievements as mayor of the city of Vienna are immortal, in the
best sense of the word. But all that could not save the monarchy-it came
too late.
His rival, Schonerer, saw this more clearly.
All of Dr. Lueger's practical efforts were marvellously successful; but
the hoped-for results never materialized.
Schonerer failed to attain his goals, but his most terrible fears came true.
Thus both these men failed to attain their ultimate objectives. Lueger
couldn't save Austria, and Schonerer couldn't save the German people in
Austria from ruin.
To study the causes offailure in the case of these two parties is to learn
a highly instructive lesson for our own time. This is especially useful for
my friends, because in many points the circumstances of our own day are
similar to those of that time. Therefore such a lesson may help us to guard
against the mistakes that brought one of those movements to an end, and
rendered the other sterile.

 

[Naofumi]

3.20 THE CAUSES OF SCHONERER'S FAILURE
In my opinion, the collapse of the pan-German movement in Austria
must be attributed to three causes.
First, the leaders didn't have a clear concept of the importance of the
social problem, particularly for a new and revolutionary party.
SchOnerer and his followers directed their attention primarily to the
bourgeoisie. For that reason, the party was bound to turn out mediocre and
tame.
The German bourgeoisie, especially in its upper circles, is pacifist even
to the point of complete self-abnegation-though some may not be aware
of this-wherever the internal affairs of the nation or state are concerned.
In good times, which in this case means times of good government, such a
psychological attitude makes this class extraordinarily valuable to the state.
But when there is bad government, such a quality has a destructive effect.
In order to assure the possibility of carrying through a really serious
struggle, the pan-German movement should have devoted its efforts to
winning over the masses. The failure to do this left the movement, from
the very beginning, without the elemental impulse that such a wave needs
if it's not to shortly ebb away.
In failing to see the truth of this principle clearly at the very outset of
the movement, and in neglecting to put it into practice, the new party made
an initial mistake from which it couldn't recover. The numerous moderate
bourgeois elements admitted into the movement increasingly determined
its internal orientation. This preempted all further prospects of gaining any
appreciable support among the masses. Under such conditions, the
movement couldn't get beyond mere discussion and criticism. Quasi
religious faith and the spirit of sacrifice were no longer found in the
movement. Their place was taken by the effort towards 'positive'
collaboration, which in this case meant acknowledging the existing state
of affairs. Such a gradual whittling away of the rough comers of the
questions in dispute resulted in the making of a dishonorable peace.
Such was the fate of the pan-German movement because, from the
start, the leaders didn't realize that the most important condition of success
was to recruit their followers from the broad masses. The movement thus
became 'bourgeois' and 'respectable' -and only moderately 'radical. '

 

[TenzenT]

In Mein Kampf Hitler divided mankind into three categories - founders of culture, bearers of culture, and destroyers of culture. His argument was that only Aryans were the founders of culture and it was the European (and American) influence of Japan that allowed for their own progress.

"Since the Jew - for reasons that I shall deal with immediately - never had a civilization of his own, he has always been furnished by others with a basis for his intellectual work. His intellect has always developed by the use of those cultural achievements which he has found ready-to-hand around him."

"That is why the Jewish people, despite intellectual powers with which they are apparently endowed, have not a culture, certainly not a culture of their own. The culture which the Jew enjoys today is the product of the work of others and this product is debased in the hands of the Jew.

"...we must bear in mind the essential fact that there has never been any Jewish art and consequently that nothing of this kind exists today." - this remark is in relation to his belief that Jews do not have a culture of their own.

"No. The Jews have not the creative abilities which are necessary to the founding of a civilization; for in them there is not, and never has been, the spirit of idealism which is an absolutely necessary element in the higher development of mankind. Therefore Jewish intellect will never be constructive but always destructive."

View attachment 8142



Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question - Marx characterizes the Jews of Europe as not having a real religious culture, but instead focusing their social integrity on materialism.
Martin Luther, On Jews and Their Lies - Many of Hitler's "remedies" were prescribed by Luther in this book.
While Nietzsche was vocally anti-fascist, his writings (especially The Will to Power) were popular among Nazis, who saw his conception of the "ubermensch" as an alternative to the Jewish "untermensch."
Kant and Hegel also characterized the Jews as irredeemable and a social and economic drain on Europe. John Weiss (Ideology of Death) does a good job of tracing anti-semitism through philosophical and religious texts in Europe leading up to the war, and has interesting things to say about Kant and Hegel.
I do think, however, that Hitler's ideas about Jews were less a philosophical conclusion and more a reflection of a broader culture of self-destructive fantasy in Germany after WWII. Sigfried Kracauer discussed this in From Caligari to Hitler.

The German people, or Volk, were, he believed, a single ethnicity
with unique and singular self-interests. They were-indisputably
responsible for many of the greatest achievements in Western history. They
were among the leading lights in music, literature, architecture, science,
and technology. They were great warriors, and great nation-builders. They
were, in large part, the driving force behind Western civilization itself. All
this is true and undeniable, and Hitler is justly proud of his heritage. Equally
is he outraged at the indignities suffered by this great people in then-recent
decades-culminating in the disastrous humiliation ofWWI and the Treaty
of Versailles. He seeks, above all, to remedy these injustices and restore
greatness to the German people. To do this, he needs to identify both their
primary opponents and the defective political ideologies and structures that
bind them. Then he undertakes to outline a new socio-political system that
can carry them forward to a higher and rightful destiny. He accomplishes
all this, and more.
Finally, in its fourth aspect, Mein Kampf is a kind of blueprint for action.
It describes the evolution and aims of National Socialism and the NSDAP,
or Nazi Party, in compelling detail. Hitler naturally wants his new
movement to succeed in assuming power in Germany and in a future
German Reich. But this is no theoretical analysis. Hitler is nothing if not
pragmatic. He has concrete goals and precise means of achieving them. He
has nothing but disdain for the geistigen Waffen, the intellectual weapons,
of the impotent intelligentsia. He demands results, and success. By all
accounts, he achieved both.

Born on 20 April 1 889 in present-day
Austria, Hitler grew up as a citizen of the multi-ethnic state known as the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. This diverse amalgamation was formed in 1867,
with the union of the Austrian and Hungarian monarchies; thus does Hitler
refer to the state as the "Double Monarchy." Throughout its 50-year history,
it was always a loose conjunction of many ethnicities, and never a truly
unified state. The ethnic Germans in it were a minority, and had to struggle
to promote their own interests. This fact caused Hitler no end of distress;
he explicitly felt more attachment to the broader German Volk than to the
multi-ethnic state into which he was born.
As a youth, his interests tended toward the arts, painting, and history. This
led to conflict with his obstinate father, who envisioned a safe, comfortable,
bureaucratic career for his son. But his father's death on 3 January 1903,
when Adolf was 13, allowed the young man to determine his own future.
Two years later he moved to Vienna, scraping by with manual labor jobs to
survive. In late 1907, his mother died. At the age of 1 8, he then applied to
enter the Viennese arts academy in painting, but was diverted to architecture.
He worked and studied for two more years, eventually becoming skilled
enough to work fulltime as a draftsman and painter of watercolors.
All the while, he studied the mass of humanity around him. He read the
various writings and publications of the political parties. He observed the
workings of the press. He watched how unions functioned. He sat in on
Parliament. He followed events in neighboring Germany. And he became
intrigued by the comings and goings of one particular Viennese minority:
the Jews.
Gradually he became convinced that the two dominant threats to
German well-being were Marxism-a Jewish form of communism-and
the international capitalist Jews. The problems were compounded by the
fundamentally inept workings of a representative democracy that tried to
serve diverse ethnicities. In the end, the fine and noble concept of
democracy became nothing other than a "Jewish democracy," working for
the best interests of Jews instead of Austrians or Germans.
Upon turning 23 in 1912, Hitler went to Munich. It was his first extended
contact with German culture, and he found it invigorating. He lived there
for two years, until the outbreak of WWI in July 1914. Thrilled at the
opportunity to defend the German homeland, he enlisted, serving on the
Western front in Belgium. After more than 2 years of service, he was lightly
wounded in October 1916 and sent back to Germany, spending some time
in a reserve battalion in Munich. Appalled at both the role of Jews there and
the negative public attitude, he returned to the front in March 1917.

By this time, the war had been dragging on for some two and a half
years. It had effectively become a stalemate. Even the looming entrance of
the Americans into the war-President Wilson would call for war the next
month, and US troops would soon follow-would have little near-term
effect. As Hitler explains, however, the Germans actually had reasons for
optimism by late 1917. The Central Powers (primarily Germany and
Austria-Hungary) had inflicted a decisive defeat on Italy in the Battle of
Caporetto, and the Russians had pulled out of the war after the Bolshevik
revolution, thus freeing up German troops for the Western front. Hitler
recalls that his compatriots "looked forward with confidence" to the spring
of 1918, when they anticipated final victory.
NOVEMBER REVOLUTION, AND A NEW MOVEMENT
But things would tum out differently. German dissatisfaction with the
prolonged war effort was being fanned by Jewish activists calling for mass
demonstrations, strikes, and even revolution against the Kaiser. In late
January 1918 there was a large munitions strike. Various workers' actions
and riots followed for months afterward. The Western front held, but
Germany was weakening internally.
In mid-October of 1918, the German front near Ypres, Belgium was hit with
mustard gas. Hitler's eyes were badly affected, and he was sent to a military
hospital in Pasewalk, north of Berlin. In late October, a minor naval revolt in
Kiel began to spread to the wider population. Two major Jewish-led parties, the
Social Democrats (SPD) and the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD),
agitated for the Kaiser to abdicate-which he did, on November 9. Jewish
activists in Berlin and Munich then declared independent "soviet" states; for a
detailed discussion of these events, see Dalton (2014). Germany formally
capitulated on November 11. After the dust had settled, a new 'Weimar'
government was formed, one that was notably sympathetic to Jewish interests.
Hearing about the revolution from his hospital bed, Hitler was
devastated. All the effort and sacrifices made at the front had proven
worthless. Jewish agitators in the homeland had succeeded in whipping up
local dissatisfaction to the point that the Kaiser was driven from power.
The revolutionaries then assumed power and immediately surrendered to
the enemy. This was the infamous "stab in the back" that would haunt
German nationalists for years to come. And it was the triggering event that
caused Hitler to enter politics.

Ancient and middle age history is the antithesis of this, largest human empire before U.S? Rome, Mediterranean, the so called aryans were tribal savages

 

[Naofumi]

3.21 PAN-GERMANS AND PARLIAMENT
From this failure came the second cause of its rapid decline.
The position of the Germans in Austria was already desperate when
pan-Germanism arose. Year after year, parliament was being used more
and more as an instrument for the slow destruction of the German-Austrian
people. The only hope for an eleventh-hour effort to save it lay in the
overthrow of the parliamentary system; but there was very little prospect
of this happening.
Thus the movement was confronted with a question of primary
importance:
To overthrow the parliament, should the pan-Germanists have entered
it 'to undermine it from within,' as they say? Or should they have attacked
the institution as such from the outside?
They went in, and came out defeated.
But they were compelled to enter.
In order to wage an effective war against such a power from the outside,
indomitable courage and a ready spirit of sacrifice are necessary weapons.
In such cases, the bull must be seized by the horns. Furious attacks may drive
you to the ground again and again. But if you have a stout heart, you will
stand up, perhaps with broken bones. And only after a long and tough struggle
will you triumph. New fighters are attracted to a cause by the appeal of great
sacrifices made for its sake, until at last tenacity is rewarded with success.
For such a result, however, the children of the the great masses are
necessary.
They alone have the requisite determination and tenacity to fight
through to the end.
But the pan-German movement didn't have these broad masses, and
so the only other solution was to enter parliament.
It would be a mistake to think that this decision resulted from a long
series of internal moral hesitations, or that it was the outcome of careful
calculation. No; they didn't even consider another solution. Those who
participated in this blunder were motivated by vague notions regarding the
significance and effect of participating in an institution that they had
condemned on principle. In general, they hoped that they would thus be
able to promote their cause to the great masses of people, because they
could speak before 'the forum of the whole nation. ' Also, it seemed
reasonable to believe that by attacking the root of the evil, they would be
more effective than by attacking from outside. They believed that, if

 

[Naofumi]

protected by the immunity of parliament, the position of the individual
protagonists would be strengthened, and that therefore the force of their
attacks would be enhanced.
In reality, everything turned out very differently.
The forum before which the pan-German representatives spoke hadn't
grown greater, but had actually become smaller. Each spoke only to the
circle that was ready to listen to him or could read the report of his speech
in the newspapers.
But the largest forum of direct listeners isn't the parliamentary
auditorium; it's the great public meeting.
Here alone there will be thousands of men who have come simply to
hear what a speaker has to say, whereas in parliament only a few hundred
are present. For the most part, they are there only to earn their daily
attendance fees and not to be enlightened by the wisdom of one of the
'representatives of the people.'
Above all: The same public is always present, and it never wishes to
learn anything new. Setting aside the question of its intelligence, it lacks
even that modest amount of will power that's necessary for learning.
Not one of the peoples' representatives will honor a superior truth and
devote himself to its service. No, not one of them will do this, unless he
has grounds for hoping that, by such a conversion, he can retain the
representation of his constituency in the coming legislature. Therefore, only
when it becomes obvious that the old party is likely to have a bad time at
the forthcoming elections, will those models of manly virtue set out in
search of a new party or a new policy that may have better electoral
prospects. But of course, this change of position will be accompanied by a
veritable deluge of high moral justifications. And thus it always happens
that, when an existing party has incurred such general disfavor among the
public that it is threatened with a crushing defeat, then a great migration
begins. The parliamentary rats abandon the party ship.
All this happens not because the affected individuals have become
better informed on the questions at issue and have resolved to act
accordingly. These superficial changes are evidence only of that gift of
clairvoyance that warns the parliamentary flea at the right moment, and
causes him to hop into another warm party bed.
To speak before such a forum signifies casting pearls before a certain
well-known animal. It is truly worthless! The result will always be negative.
And that's what actually happened. The pan-German deputies could
have talked themselves hoarse: but to no result.

 

[Naofumi]

The press either ignored them totally or so mutilated their speeches
that the logical consistency was destroyed, and the meaning twisted around
in such a way that the public got the wrong impression of the aims of the
new movement. What the individual members said wasn't important. The
important matter was what people read as coming from them. This
consisted of mere extracts that had been taken out of context, and gave an
impression of incoherent nonsense-as was in fact intended. Thus the only
public before which they really spoke consisted of a mere 500
parliamentarians-and that says it all.
But the worst was the following:
The pan-German movement could only hope for success if the leaders
realized from the very start that it was not a question of a new party as of
a new worldview. This alone could arouse the inner moral forces that were
necessary for such a gigantic struggle. And for this struggle, the leaders
must be men of first-class minds and indomitable courage.
If the struggle on behalf of a worldview is not led by men of heroic
spirit who are ready to sacrifice everything, it will soon become impossible
to find real warriors who are ready to die for the cause. A man who fights
only for his own existence has little remaining for society.
In order to secure the requirements for success, everyone concerned
must understand that the new movement looks to posterity for its honor
and glory, and that it has nothing to offer to present-day members. If a
movement offers a large number of positions and offices to be filled, the
number of inferior candidates will constantly grow. Eventually, a day will
come when there will be such a preponderance of political profiteers that
the original combatants will now scarcely recognize their own party. They
may even be ejected by the later arrivals as unwanted ballast. At this point,
the 'mission' of the movement is lost.
Once the pan-Germanists decided to collaborate with parliament, they
were no longer leaders and combatants in a popular movement, but merely
'parliamentarians. ' The movement thus sank to the level of a common
political party, and no longer had the strength to face a hostile fate and defy
the risk of martyrdom. Instead of fighting, the pan-German leaders fell into
the habit of 'talking' and 'negotiating. ' These new parliamentarians soon
found that it was a more satisfactory, and less risky, way of fulfilling their
task: to defend their new worldview with the intellectual weapon of
parliamentary rhetoric rather than take up a fight in which they would risk
their lives. Such a fight would have uncertain outcomes, and offer no
possibility of personal gain.

 

[Naofumi]

3.22 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SPOKEN WORD
Once they had members in parliament, their outside supporters hoped
and waited for miracles. Of course, no such miracles occurred, or could
occur. The supporters of the movement soon grew impatient, because
reports they read about their own deputies was in no way up to their
expectations. The reason for this wasn't hard to find. It was due to the fact
that a hostile press failed to give a true account of what the pan-German
deputies were actually doing.
As the new deputies became accustomed to this mild form of
'revolution,' and to the provincial diets, they gradually became reluctant
to resume the more hazardous work of expounding the movement's
principles to the broad masses of the people.
Mass meetings in public became rarer and rarer, though these are the
only means of exercising an effective influence on people. Here, the
influence comes from direct personal contact, and earns the support oflarge
numbers.
Once the parliamentary platform was substituted for the beer-hall table,
where thousands were addressed, and once speeches were no longer
addressed to the people directly but to the so-called 'chosen'
representatives, the pan-German movement lost its popular character. It
soon degenerated to the level of an academic discussion club.
Thus, the misleading impression created by the press was no longer
corrected by personal contact with the people through public meetings,
wherein a true account might be given. The end result of this neglect was
that the word 'pan-German' came to have an unpleasant sound in the ears
of the masses.
The knights of the pen and the literary snobs of today must realize that
the great transformations that have taken place in this world were never
conducted by a goose-quill!
No-the task of the pen must always be reserved to that of presenting
the theoretical foundations.
The force that has ever and always set in motion great historical
avalanches of religious and political movements is the magic power of the
spoken word.
The broad masses of a population are more amenable to the appeal of
rhetoric than to any other force. All great movements are popular
movements. They are the volcanic eruptions of human passions and
emotions, stirred into activity either by the ruthless Goddess of Distress or

 

[Naofumi]

by the torch of the spoken word cast into the people's midst. In no case
have great movements been set afoot by the syrupy effusions of literary
aesthetes and drawing-room heroes.
A nation's destiny can be averted only by a storm of hot passion. But
only those who are passionate themselves can arouse passion in others.
It's only the capacity for passionate feeling that, like hammer blows,
will open the door to the hearts of the people.
3.23 EFFECT ON THE MASS
He who is incapable of passionate feeling and speech was never chosen
by Providence to proclaim its will.
Therefore a mere writer should stick to his ink-bottle and busy himself
with theoretical questions, if he has the requisite ability and knowledge.
He has been neither born nor chosen to be a leader.
A movement that has great ends to achieve must carefully guard against
the danger of losing contact with the masses of the people.
Every question encountered must be examined primarily from this
viewpoint, and the decision to be made must always be accordingly.
The movement must avoid everything that might weaken its power of
influencing the masses-not from 'demagogic' motives but because of the
simple fact that no great idea, no matter how sublime and exalted it may
appear, can be realized in practice without the effective power of the
popular masses.
Hard reality alone must mark the way to the goal. Unwillingness to
walk the road of hardship means, only too often in this world, the total
renunciation of one's aims and purposes-whether consciously willed or
not.
As soon as the pan-German leaders accepted the parliamentary
principle and moved the center of their activities away from the people,
they sacrificed the future for the sake of a cheap momentary success.
They chose the easier way in the struggle, and in doing so rendered
themselves unworthy of final victory.
While in Vienna, I used to seriously ponder over these two questions.
I saw that the main reason for the collapse of the pan-German movement
lay in the fact that these very questions were underappreciated. In my
opinion, the movement seemed chosen to lead the German element in
Austria.

 

[Naofumi]

These first two blunders, which led to the downfall of the pan-German
movement, were very closely related. Faulty recognition of the inner
driving forces that push great movements forward led to an inadequate
appreciation of the part played by the broad masses. The result was that
too little attention was given to the social problem, and that attempts to
capture the minds of the lower classes were too few and too weak. Another
failure was in accepting the parliamentary policy.
If there had been a proper appreciation of the tremendous powers of
endurance always shown by the masses in revolutionary movements, a
different attitude towards the social problem and propaganda would have
been taken. The movement's center wouldn't have been transferred to
parliament, but would have remained in the workshops and the streets.
3.24 THE 'AWAY-FROM-ROME' MOVEMENT
There was a third mistake, one that also had its roots in the failure to
understand the value of the masses. The masses are first set in motion, in a
definite direction, by men of superior talents. But once in motion, they are
like a flywheel; they sustain the momentum and steady balance of the
offensive.
The policy of the pan-German leaders in deciding to carry through a
hard struggle against the Catholic Church can be explained only by
attributing it to an inadequate understanding of the spiritual nature of the
people.
The reasons why the new party engaged in a violent campaign against
Rome were as follows:
As soon as the House ofHabsburg had definitely decided to transform
Austria into a Slav State, all sorts of means were adopted that seemed to
serve that end. The Habsburg rulers had no scruples of conscience about
exploiting even religious institutions in the service of this new 'State Idea. '
One of the many methods thus employed was the use of Czech parishes
and their clergy as instruments for spreading Slav hegemony throughout
Austria.
This proceeding was carried out as follows:
Czech priests were appointed in purely German districts. They
gradually and steadily pushed forward the interests of the Czech people
before those of the Church, and thus became germ cells in the de
Germanization process.

 

[Naofumi]

Unfortunately the German-Austrian clergy completely failed to counter
this procedure. Not only were they incapable of taking a similar initiative
d.
George SchOnerer wasn't a man who did things half-way. He went into
battle against the Church because he was convinced that this was the only
way to save the German people. The "Away-from-Rome" movement
seemed the most powerful, but at the same time most difficult, way of
attacking the adversary's citadel. SchOnerer believed that if this movement
succeeded, the tragic division between the two great religious denominations
in Germany would be wiped out, and the inner forces of the German Reich
and nation would be enormously enhanced by such a victory.
But both the premise and the conclusion in this case were erroneous.
It was undoubtedly true that the national powers of resistance, in
everything concerning Germanism as such, were much weaker among the
German Catholic clergy than among their non-German brethren, especially
the Czechs.

 

[Naofumi]

And only a fool could be unaware of the fact that it never entered the
mind of the German clergy to take the offensive on behalf of German
interests.
But at the same time, everyone who isn't blind to facts must admit that
' State authority, ' 'democracy, ' 'pacifism, ' 'international solidarity, '
etc.-all such notions become rigid, dogmatic concepts with us. And the
more vital the general necessities of the nation, the more will they be judged
exclusively in light of those concepts.
This unfortunate habit of looking at all national demands from the
viewpoint of a pre-conceived notion makes it impossible for us to see the
subjective side of a thing that objectively contradicts one's own doctrine.
It finally leads to a complete reversal of means and ends. Any attempt at a
national revival will be opposed if a pre-condition is that a bad and

 

[Naofumi]

uh oh i gotta stop pasting this shit before the forum gets taken down

 

[Naofumi]